The situation
Southern euro countries are in a situation of vulnerability due to three factors: their high debt levels, their eroded competitiveness and their difficulties to restart growth.
Together, these factors generate a difficult-to-exit vicious circle that can even degenerate in a self-fulfilling economic downward spiral.
The reason is that deleveraging and price adjustment to regain competitiveness take time and require austerity, leading to output losses or stagnation. And with weak or negative growth the debt to GDP ratio worsens, forcing additional austerity measures that further weaken growth and the debt position. Progressive deterioration of the debt position leads to higher default risk premiums, which make the debt position worse.
Unless stopped, this self-reinforcing process can lead to debt deflation and stagnation, or eventual financial market access loss leading to bankruptcy and deep recession. 
The context
To deal with this difficult economic legacy the south operates in a context that leaves very limited room for policy support, and so makes the adjustment even harder. Two key elements frame the adverse working context of debtor countries. On the one hand, they have a highly constrained tool-kit for macroeconomic stabilization. On the other, their productive structure is especially vulnerable to the intense global competition coming from emerging markets. Let us turn to discuss these issues.
The macro stabilization tool-kit of a stand-alone country includes the interest rate and exchange rate tools, the fiscal stand at federal and/or national levels, and, of course, market stabilization via price and quantity adjustments. The latter tends to be painful, and can be partially offset by the former monetary and fiscal tools.
In contrast to a stand-alone country, a euro zone member own tool-kit consists of the national fiscal stand and the market adjustment. There are three important constraints embedded in this stabilization kit. First, the fiscal level is incomplete, since there is no federal level for Eurozone wide fiscal actions and cross-country risk-sharing. Second, member countries lack own interest rate and exchange rate that can be adjusted to fit domestic macroeconomic needs, thus limiting their ability to counteract macroeconomic hardship. Third, members have lost the capacity to issue debt in a currency that is under their own control, a fact that makes sovereign defaults possible and so countries prone to sovereign crises, since they promise to pay something they may run out of. The second key context element is the sectoral structure of southern countries. As it turns out, their sectoral economic activity has tilted since the introduction of the euro to the middle-low technology side rather than to the middle-high. This kind of specialization makes the south more vulnerable to emerging markets competition.
Additionally, it makes the lack of a full-fledge stabilization tool-kit even more costly in a context characterized by a euro-wide macroeconomic policy that favors a strong euro and by the lack of clear progress in euro-wide risk-sharing institutions, like banking union or further fiscal integration. The decision to start the preparation for the adoption of the euro was formalized in 1992, and it was a political decision. The early 1990s were European integration euphoria times. A number of relevant pro-European politician were in power and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc brought the issue of German reunification. To a large extent the reunification of Germany and the single currency decision run in parallel. It was a way of seeing the reintegration of Eastern Germany as part of a more general push to foster European integration. But this political optimism was an obstacle for a careful assessment of the potential economic consequences of the decision to adopt the euro. In fact, the economic foundations of the euro case were fragile: a set of diverse countries in terms of productive structures, regulatory frameworks and macroeconomic policy traditions, which could hardly be defined as an optimal currency area, decided to form a monetary union. A transatlantic economic debate was on during the 1990s, with some prominent American economists claiming that the euro could end up being more a source of friction and division than an element for further integration. But the European view downplayed the risk, presenting the single currency as the natural step to complete the single market, and arguing that the Eurozone would become a proper currency area along the way.
So the euro project started. And it did it as plain monetary union, with just some fiscal coordination embedded in the so-called Stability and Growth Pact and a non-bail-out clause stating that no country would be rescued by neighbor members. No prospects of a fiscal or even a banking union were in sight.
Given the strong political will and optimism, the market trusted the euro project. Once the euro was introduced financial market treated member countries as equally risky, providing financial resources at a single interest rate, historically low for peripheral countries. In fact, the introduction of the euro set the stage for a surge of cross-border lending-borrowing among member countries that neglected country risk differences.
Ten years later, Europe found itself split into creditors and debtors, and the euro crisis imploded.
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The way out
The crisis has uncovered some key institutional flaws of the euro architecture and has left a large debt overhang. The way out of the crisis requires finding a sensible solution to these political economy problems. And to be sensible the solution must take into account how we got to the current state of affairs. Let us look at the relevant aspects of this debate.
There are three structural institutional flaws that the crisis has highlighted as especially harmful. The first is the lack of significant progress in national structural reforms. The second is the lack of a banking union. The third is a central bank that cannot perform effectively the crucial role of lender of last resort.
A main reason why structural reforms are important for a country that belongs to a monetary union is that they provide the way to have a lubricated market mechanism that can at least partially make up for the loss of monetary stabilization tools that the monetary union membership entails. Lubricating the market means eliminating obstacles to competition, which then delivers the wage and price flexibility and labor mobility that allows the smoothing out of economic fluctuation through the market adjustment buffer. The so-called Lisbon Agenda 2000-2010 was the European institutional instrument put in place to promote national structural reforms. It did not work. And only as a reaction to the current crisis have some member countries started to accelerate some of these reforms. But there is still a long way ahead.
The lack of banking union has been highly damaging. Without effective euro-wide banking supervision it was first contributing to the misallocation in the south of credit from the north, both in size (bubbles) and targeted sectors (low-middle tech). And once the crisis imploded it has led to banking fragmentation, with northern banks reducing exposition to the south and the south left with a credit crunch due to its zombie banks, and with the risk of experiencing a destructive sovereign-banking loop, as illustrated by the case of Spain, which in order to stop the loop was forced to borrow European funds and rescue part of its banking system. The design of the European Central bank (ECB) is another important institutional fragility. In contrast to the Fed or the Bank of Japan, the ECB was designed as an institution protected against sovereign bankruptcies. That is, potential sovereign bankruptcies could not lead to ECB negative net worth. In practice, this means that the ECB is not supposed to have euro members' sovereign debt in its asset portfolio. But this has two important implications. First, the ECB cannot regularly buy public debt issued by member states; and second, it lacks the necessary fiscal backing to guarantee price stability in the event of a capital loss generated by potential nonperforming assets. The latter implication has not been operating yet. But the first one has been highly visible, as risk premiums reflected the increasing market fear of an actual sovereign default in a context where the central bank does not have free-hands to buy public debt, and so cannot kill default risk by being always ready to buy the debt as a last resort.
Improving the market adjustment mechanism, making steady and credible progress toward banking union, and guaranteeing the commitment of the ECB to buy unlimited debt of sovereigns that are arguably solvent at default-free interest rates are lines for immediate progress to the way out of the crisis. However, the implementation of these or similar proposals requires as a precondition a solution for the debt overhang, a burden that is weighing too heavy and that the south is unlikely to successfully manage on its own. Why to share the burden? If one looks back and makes a brief account of euro events one finds things like the following: The monetary union had a European political seed; it was designed too fast with important flaws in its initial institutional architecture; it brought short term benefits to the south but also to the north, which kept its industrial base competitive and strong; it has been characterized by systematic breaches of its basic rules, namely its fiscal pact and its non-bail-out clause, the later breached to save northern banks from southern default.
The unavoidable conclusion out of this kind of accounts is that the euro crisis is a European collective responsibility, and so that it is just morally right that the consequences and potential solutions be shared collectively. Debt sharing requires collective fiscal resources. Progress in banking union requires collective fiscal resources for the deposit guarantee and the resolution funds. Getting a central bank that acts as an effective lender of last resort requires some collective fiscal resources to provide fiscal backing to the ECB. This set of collective actions constitutes a minimum requirement for a sustainable euro.
Would they be undertaken? Well, the answer might hinge upon the collective ability to deal with the consequences of the initial partial debt write-down. This write-down will create a moral hazard problem in the south and a corresponding reluctance in the north to start over the game unless it is fully convinced that new rescues will not be again the outcome. It is therefore crucial that the write-down be presented as what it should be: A once and for all event justified because it is the result of an unprecedented historical experiment that has uncovered mistakes that will never be made again.
With the debt clock reset to sustainable levels, correcting past mistakes will require a new fiscal pact that shifts fiscal responsibility to member countries and a new non-bailout clause that will need to be made credible through eventual painful country defaults.
